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ration would normally be accompanied by the in-
tent on behalf of each participant that his contribu-
tion be merged into a unitary whole. Additionally,
the court noted that the case law on the subject has
read the statutory definition literally, so that intent
is required for all works of joint authorship.
The court next considered the issue of whether the
contribution of each of the authors must be copy-
rightable; or rather whether the combined result of
both of the authors must be copyrightable in order
for each contributor to qualify as ajoint author. The
court noted that the case law on the subject sup-
ported the requirement that each contribution be
copyrightable. The court considered that if each
separate contribution were required to be copyrigh-
table, spurious claims of joint authorship might be
prevented. The court also emphasized the impor-
tance of contract law, noting that a person who
contributes non-copyrightable materials toward a
copyrightable work is free to enter into a contract
which would give that personjoint ownership of the
resulting copyright.
For these reasons, the court held that the separate
contribution of each party must be copyrightable in
order for joint-authorship to exist.6 The court rec-
ognized that the literal reading of the statute did
not support this requirement, and that there were
arguments against this view; however, the court
emphasized that its decision struck an appropriate
balance between copyright and contract law.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the nature
of the intent required under the statutory definition
ofjoint work. The court noted that, under the statu-
tory definition, the relevant state of mind was
whether the parties intended that their contribu-
tions be merged into a unitary whole. However, the
court reasoned that this definition would extend
joint-author status to parties who were unlikely to
have been within the contemplation of Congress.
For example, the court explained that the definition
would extend joint author status to parties such as
writers and editors. To avoid this result, the court
articulated a rule that, in order for joint authorship
to exist, all parties must have intended this result.7
The test the court recognized was whether each
party intended to be identified as co-authors.8
In applying this rule to the facts, the court noted
that there was no evidence that Childress would
have accepted crediting the play as being written
by Alice Childress and Clarice Taylor. In support of
its conclusion, the court emphasized that Childress
had rejected all of Taylor's attempts to negotiate a
co-ownership agreement. The court affin ed the
lower court's conclusion that Childress did not in-
tend that she and Taylor be considered joint
authors of the play.9
Taylor argued that when the lower court held that
Childress did not intend to be a joint author, the
lower court misapplied the statutory standard by
requiring that Childress intend the legal conse-
quences which flowed from joint authorship. The
appellate court rejected this argument, holding
that the lower court applied the proper standard
which was whether the parties entertained in their
minds the concept ofjoint ownership. 10 Because the
court held that Childress lacked the requisite in-
tent for joint authorship, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision which granted summary
judgment in favor of Childress."
Conclusion
The appellate court held that in order for joint
authorship to exist, all parties must have intended
this result. In holding that each party's contribu-
tion must be independently copyrightable in order
to qualify as ajoint author under the Copyright Act,
the court emphasized the importance of contract
law which allows those parties who contribute non-
copyrightable material toward a joint effort to pro-
tect their rights through contract. Because the
court found that Childress did not have the requi-
site intent forjoint authorship, it did not review the
lower court's finding that Taylor's contributions
were not independently copyrightable. Q
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The Fellowship of Friends,
Inc. v. County of Yuba,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Introduction
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the judge-
ment of the trial court which ruled that a building,
Goethe Academy, which was owned by the plaintiff,
The Fellowship of Friends, Inc., was not a museum
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as contemplated in Article XIII, section 3(d) of the
California Constitution1 and in Section 202(a)(2) of
the Revenue and Taxation Code.2 Under those sec-
tions, museums which are free and open to the
public are exempt from property taxation. The de-
fendant, the County of Yuba, denied the Fellowship
the museum tax exemption for the Academy. The
appellate court determined that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that the Academy was used prin-
cipally or significantly as a museum and that the
defendant properly denied the exemption.
Facts
The Fellowship is a religious organization which
owns property in Yuba County that contains the
Goethe Academy building. The Fellowship organi-
zation believes in collecting fine art and artifacts
for the purposes of changing the viewer's spiritual
and emotional state and in preserving the art for
future generations. The Fellowship stores its collec-
tion of art at the Academy. The Academy building
also serves as a residence for the founder and leader
of the Fellowship, living quarters for other mem-
bers of the organization, and a hall for dinners,
conferences, lectures, weddings, and concerts.
In 1983, the Fellowship opened the Academy to the
public. By appointment, visitors were allowed to
enter for free to view the collection. The art was
displayed in an area on the first floor which com-
prised approximately 60% of the total floor space.
The academy entertained an average of about 300
guests per year over the tax years 1985-1986, 1986-
1987, and 1987-1988. In 1985 the Fellowship ap-
plied for a property tax exemption for 63% of its
property. The Fellowship claimed that the property
was a free public museum under Article XII, sec-
tion 3(d) of the California Constitution and section
202(a)(2) of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Yuba
denied the exemption and denied similar requests
by the Fellowship during the two subsequent tax
years.
The Fellowship filed a complaint against Yuba
wherein it claimed to be tax exempt as a museum
and asked to be reimbursed for the taxes it paid
during the three tax years which Yuba denied it tax
exempt status. The trial court held that the Fellow-
ship failed to prove that the Academy was used
predominantly as a public museum and found for
Yuba. The Fellowship appealed the trial court's
decision.
Legal Analysis
First, the Fellowship argued that the trial court
erred when it construed that a museum, for the
purpose of attaining a tax exempt status, was prop-
erty used "primarily" or "predominantly" as a mu-
seum. The appellate court examined the appropri-
ateness of the trial court's definition of museum
under the law. The appellate court noted that words
used in statutes or constitutional provisions award-
ing tax exemptions should be strictly construed so
that the "concession will not be enlarged nor ex-
tended beyond that plain meaning of the language
employed."3 The appellate court then stated that
when property is described by its function, that
function is assumed to be its primary use.4 There-
fore, the court concluded that since a museum is
defined as a building that houses and displays
objects of lasting value, the functions of housing
and displaying such objects shouldbe the property's
primary use.
Second, the Fellowship argued that the trial court
erred when it determined that the primary use of
the Fellowship's property was not as a museum.
The Fellowship claimed that the lower court denied
the exemption merely because the Academy was
used for multiple purposes. The appellate court
reviewed the lower court's analysis and found that
the lower court did examine the other functions of
the Academy. However, the appellate court found
that even though uses of the Academy for other
purposes does not, in itself, preclude the award of
a tax exemption, evidence of these uses is probative
of whether its primary use is that of a museum.5
The appellate court also found that evidence of the
Fellowship's appointment policy for visitors, the
remote location of the Academy, the limited hours
of operation and the minimal publicity for the build-
ing also suggested that the Academy's primary use
was not to store and display art.
Third, the Fellowship claimed that the lower court
erred when it failed to consider the Academy's func-
tion as a collector and repository of art. The Fellow-
ship explained that a museum stores art as well as
displays it and that the trial court only examined
the use of the Academy for displaying art. The
appellate court ruled that the lower court did exam-
ine both functions with respect to the Academy. It
found that the purpose of the tax exemption was to
encourage the display of art and items of value to
the public. Therefore, the appellate court found
that the use of property to exhibit art is more
significant than its use to store it for the purpose of
determining whether property constitutes a tax
exempt museum.
Conclusion
The appellate court agreed with the lower court's
finding that property must store and display ob-
jects of value in order to be a museum and that the
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property's primary function must be that of a mu-
seum in order to be tax exempt. Furthermore, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the Fellowship did not establish that the pri-
mary function of the Academy was that of a mu-
seum.
Rhonda L. Lorenz
1. Article XH, sec. 3(d) of the California Constitution, pro-
vides: 'Mhe following are exempt from property taxation:... (d)
Property used for libraries and museums that are free and open
to the public and property used exclusively for public schools,
community colleges, state colleges, and state universities." CAL.
CONST. ART. XII, § 3(d).
2. Revenue and Taxation Code section 202(a)(2) provides:
'The exemption of the following property is as specified in
subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (h) of Section of article XIII of the
Constitution, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a) of
Section 11 thereof:... (2) Property used for free public libraries
and free museums." CAL. REv. & TAXi Cons § 202(a)(2) (West
1992).
3. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. County of
Sonoma, 44 CalApp.3d 23, 27 (1974).
4. The Fellowship of Friends, Inc. v. County of Yuba, 1
Cal.Rptr.2d 284,286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
5. Id. at 288.
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